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Abstract
One of the key mottos of system transfor-
mation in Poland after the fall of communism in 
1989 was far-reaching decentralization. These 
transformation processes encompassed also the 
sector of culture. Now, this strong trend towards 
decentralization has been mitigated or even re-
versed. This paper will review many of the con-
cerns which have been articulated in relation to 
the centralization/decentralization conundrum. 
The main aim of this paper is to test the assump-
tion that cultural policy in Poland faces recentral-
ization, by means of political, fi scal and admin-
istrative indicators to track the dynamics of its 
recent shifts. To look at this tendency I conduct-
ed a comparative analysis of the cultural policy 
instruments in two periods: the coalition of The 
Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party 2007-
2015, and Law and Justice Party 2015-2017. The 
study contributes to knowledge of political, fi scal 
and administrative settings of cultural policy re-
centralization in Poland.
Keywords: cultural policy, decentralization, 
recentralization, central and local government, 
cultural management.
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1. Introduction
 ere is an endless tension between centralization and decentralization in the 
contemporary states (Sahin, 1973; Cummings, 1995; Vestlund, 2015). Recent decades, 
in particular the fall of the communism in Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1980s, 
brought about the tendency towards decentralization which shaped a new facet of 
governance in transition and in developing countries as well (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
1998; Sharma, 2005; Pollit, 2005; Shah and Shah, 2006). Decentralization was seen as a 
key element of the transition processes (Crook and Manor, 2000) motivated by disen-
chantment with previous centralized modes of governance (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2006).  ere was a popular belief that bringing government closer to the people should 
result in enhanced effi  ciency and accountability than its centralized counterpart (Ro-
dríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; White, 2011; Pina-Sánchez, 2014).  e decentraliza-
tion process, however, was not rarely hampered by fundamental problems including 
the lack of a clear conception of the role of the state, le over elements of the previous 
system that limit the possibility to re-orient budgetary allocations, low vertical coher-
ence reducing reliability and predictability of government actions, weak inter-sectoral 
co-ordination limiting government abilities to adopt strategic reforms, and mechani-
cal and technical approaches to public administration (Verheijen, Smirl and Kozáková, 
2001). Most o en, the decentralization agenda has remained incomplete (Prud’homme,
1995; Litvack et al., 1998; Bahl and Martinez-Vasquez, 2006; Kaiser, 2006; Pritche  et 
al., 2010; Panday, 2017), led to unconstructive implications including the growth of 
corruption practices (Rose-Ackerman, 2004), or reduced the quality in public service 
provision (Treisman, 2000).
Decentralization is a multifaceted, complex and ongoing process which has so far 
produced justifi cations of both failure and success (Breton, 2002).  is process is also 
highly connected with the understanding of a set of goals central government should 
strive to achieve. Under certain conditions decentralization might be seen as unde-
sirable since it reduces the control power of the central government over the pub-
lic sphere (Prud’homme, 1995). Vertical decentralization, measured by the number of 
sub-national government tiers, also tends to be ineffi  cient (Dreher, 2006). At present, a 
number of indicators reveal the political tendency towards recentralization motivated 
by effi  ciency arguments (Cole and de Visscher, 2016; Loewen, 2018). 
Decentralization encompassed a great number of sectors including the cultural sec-
tor; cultural decentralization has been extensively researched based on the example 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Yosifova, 2011; Tóth, 2014; Kristóf, 2017; Kawashima, 
2004; Heiskanen, 2001; Inkei, 2009; Berzins, 2005; Katunarić, 2003; Ada et al., 2018). 
Research indicates that the decentralization process in post-communist countries has 
o en been fragmented and superfi cial. Furthermore, the recentralization shi  occurs 
in certain countries (Hajnal et al., 2018). 
 is study was designed to diversify this scholarship by providing an in-depth 
analysis assessing the condition of recentralization tendency of the cultural sector 
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in Poland, but also by bringing a broad political context of decentralization in the 
cultural policy in Poland. By building on the theory of decentralization this contribu-
tion tests the projected reality of cultural policy in Poland.  is is important because 
recentralization contributes to the consolidation of the central government’s control 
power over the public cultural sphere.
 e article is structured as follows. First, the literature review section describes the 
fundamental concepts of decentralization pointing at the heterogeneity of countries’ 
decentralization and tribulations related to the implementation of the decentralization 
agenda. Second, the paper presents a broader perspective of recentralization process 
and its implications with a focus on European post-communist countries.  e meth-
odology section introduces the research procedure to test the assumption that cultural 
policy in Poland faces recentralization by means of political, fi scal and administrative 
indicators to track the dynamics of its recent shi s. Next, the results are presented and 
discussed, concluding with implications for research and practice.
2. Decentralization in cultural policy
Cultural policy is a subsector of public policy (Paque e and Redaelli, 2015). Cultur-
al policy ‘is a large, heterogeneous set of individuals and organizations engaged in the 
creation, production, presentation, distribution and preservation and education about 
aesthetic heritage, and entertainment activities, products and artifacts’ (Wyszomirski, 
2002, p. 186). In this article I study explicit cultural policy, i.e. the policy suggestions 
that the parties themselves refer to as such (Ahearne, 2009).
Decentralization of contemporary cultural policy in Poland began in 1989, when 
signifi cant system changes were started a er 44 years of the socialist economy. In 
1990, instead of undemocratic local structures (national councils), democratic com-
munes (‘gminy’ – the lowest level of local government) with considerably greater 
powers were introduced. In 1999, the reforms were completed by introducing two ad-
ditional levels of local government – districts (‘powiaty’) and provinces (‘wojewódz-
twa’).  ese transformations forced the new local government structures in Poland to 
formulate and implement cultural policy in a new reality that would take into account 
regional and local needs (Murzyn-Kupisz, 2010). 
However, the system of cultural policy management decentralized a er 1989 has 
still remained centralized in its nature.  e reason for ‘more formal than substantial’ 
decentralization lies (at least partly) in the way administrative reforms shi ed the re-
sponsibility for culture to regional and local governments (without adequate redistri-
bution of fi nancial resources). Low level of fi nancial autonomy of cultural institutions 
resulted in their administrative dependency and politization that made it easier for 
those institutions to function (Głowacki et al., 2009). 
Being aware that decentralization ‘is an ambiguous concept, its borders not well 
defi ned’ (Prud’homme, 1995, p. 2), when assessing each model of decentralization, 
questions appear about the eff ectiveness of the developed level of the decentralization 
of the cultural policy, that is raising questions about the rationality of the decisions 
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taken in a given model, about the optimal proportions between what should be the 
center, and what lower-level authorities should deal with. 
Decentralization in cultural policy is one of the most frequently mentioned goals 
of conducting cultural policy in many countries (Cummings and Katz, 1987, p. 367), 
including post-communist countries of Central and East Europe and Southeastern 
Europe (Weeda et al., 2005; Tóth, 2011; Tóth, 2014; Katunarić, 2003; Inkei, 2009). De-
centralization gains specifi c weight in these transition countries which still carry the 
legacy of a centralized system (Alagjozovski, 2004). Despite the uniqueness of each 
of these countries they share comparable historical context of communism which 
strongly aff ects the shape of cultural policy.  e post-transition era has shown that 
political and state systems in countries of this region generally lack solid and eff ec-
tive guarantees for the representation of territorial interests, and the EU key idea 
of subsidiarity is underrepresented. It makes the implementation of decentralization 
fulfi ll only partially. In Bulgaria, the process of decentralization of cultural policy is 
seen as a fusion of inconsistent political decentralization and consistent shi  of the 
fi nancial responsibility from the state to the municipal budgets (Yosifova, 2011). In 
Romania, the fi rst wave of decentralization was made under the society pressure, and 
was unsuccessful because neither the way of thinking was changed, nor the institu-
tions were ready for this step (Chetraru, undated). In many transition countries of this 
region the speed of introducing decentralization moved too fast (Kovács et al., 2016). 
However, despite a strong drive to decentralize, the capacity for autonomous regional 
initiatives has been reduced (Suteu, 2012). Frequently, there was no clear strategy to 
understand and develop cultural policy (Bulgaria, Macedonia) (Alagjozovski, 2004). In 
consequence, to diff erent extent in every country, a new recentralization of the sys-
tem was put in practice and cultural institutions entered once again under the central 
authority subordination (Chetraru, undated). 
In literature, economic and political eff ects of decentralization or more specifi cal-
ly recentralization of cultural policies on the performance of this sector can be dis-
tinguished; however, the benefi ts of decentralization are not obvious (Prud’homme, 
1995; Kovács et al., 2016).  ere are studies fi nding out both negative and positive 
correlation with traditionally assumed positive impacts of decentralization (Sharma, 
2006). However, decentralization has been developed into the most favored policy pri-
ority which has been implemented very diff erently in diff erent countries.
In general, the key objective of cultural decentralization is spatial diff usion of 
arts-related facilities and organizations to benefi t audience and population at large 
(Kawashima, 2004). From the economic point of view, decentralization of cultural policy 
strives to equalize public expenditure regionally for the arts and culture (Kawashima, 
2004). Decentralization makes it possible to distribute public funds effi  ciently by dif-
ferent spending authorities among diff erent groups of cultural producers (Kawashima,
2004). From the political point of view decentralization allows to diff use political and 
administrative power to implement cultural policy by diff erent decision-makers, in-
cluding horizontal diff usion of responsibilities among diff erent stakeholders of pub-
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lic, private and non-profi t sector (Kawashima, 2004). Prud’homme (1995) underlines 
possible negative eff ects (both economic and political) of decentralization including 
increasing disparities and corruption, harming stability, and undermining effi  ciency. 
Frequently, a real challenge of successful decentralization is what functions to decen-
tralize, in which sectors, in which regions and how to harmonize shared production of 
the service by the various levels (Prud’homme, 1995). 
Kawashima (2004) defi nes cultural decentralization as a fair distribution of cul-
tural products among citizens by creating equal opportunities in the consumption of 
culture for every citizen irrespective of his/her gender, race, beliefs or income.  e 
following types of decentralization of cultural policy can be distinguished (Flejterski 
and Zioło, 2008; Kawashima, 2004): 
 – political (system) decentralization assumes that lower-level entities operate 
through democratically elected executive and decision-making bodies.  e high-
est degree of system decentralization is expressed in the system independence of 
the local government from the central government.
 – fi scal decentralization (decentralization of public fi nance), which concerns the 
distribution of public expenditure on culture, with the proportions between ex-
penditure from the central and local government level that ensure balancing the 
level of public expenditure on culture in the region.  is refers particularly to the 
transfer of public fi nancial resources from the central government level to local 
governments in order to guarantee fi nancing the tasks carried out by local gov-
ernments and fi nancial independence of the local governments.
 – administrative decentralization, which consists in defi ning the scope of tasks of 
local governments of particular levels and equipping these entities with adminis-
trative tools enabling the implementation of the tasks entrusted to them. Admin-
istrative decentralization can be divided into: de-concentration (the lowest level 
of decentralization), delegation and devolution (the highest level of decentraliza-
tion).
3. Method and data
 e primary aim of this research is to test the assumption that cultural policy in 
Poland faces recentralization by means of political, fi scal and administrative indica-
tors, and to track the dynamics of its recent shi s.  ere is an important underlying 
refl ection that Polish cultural policy is an area in which decentralization has been 
rather formally than substantially developed.  e following research procedures are 
used in the article: (1) integrative literature review which looks at decentralization 
in the cultural policy with a special focus on European post-communist countries, 
(2) historical approach which shows steps made towards decentralization and critical 
insights on its implementation, and (3) policy discourse analysis which deals with 
the assessment of political, fi scal and administrative se ings of cultural policy decen-
tralization/recentralization.  e policy discourse analysis is based on the theoretical 
framework developed by Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) to measure correlation between fi scal 
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decentralization and economic growth. Out of three groups of indicators, three spe-
cifi c indicators relating to cultural policy have been specifi ed – one for each group.
 – For the indicator of political decentralization – the scope of central government 
participation in the decision-making process, including state interventionism, 
which is refl ected in infl uencing the repertoire, as well as content and values in 
cultural activities. As this indicator is not subject to quantitative analysis, it will 
be discussed on the basis of declarations included in the programs of winning 
political parties in this period: Civic Platform in 2007 (‘Poland Deserves the Eco-
nomic Miracle’) and 2011 (‘ e Next Step. Together’), and Law and Justice in 2014 
(‘Health, Labor, Family’). It consolidates and describes the approach towards de-
centralized cultural policy implementation. Election programs are temporal and 
declarative.  ey do not necessarily correspond with real undertakings; however, 
they do a empt at imposing selected politically driven narratives to be imple-
mented a er winning elections.
 – For the indicator of decentralization of public fi nances – the ratio of expenditures 
of local government units and total public expenditure on culture.  is indicator 
based to a greater extent on quantitative data shows how political declarations 
translate into real actions in cultural policy.
 – For the indicator of administrative decentralization – the structure of the public 
cultural sector from the point of view of the subordination of cultural institutions 
– whether the managing unit of a cultural institution is a central body or local 
government.  is indicator prioritizes strategic moves outlined in the cultural 
policy. 
 e analysis looking at the decentralization/recentralization issue ‘is not (or not 
especially) susceptible to quantitative research’ (Manor, 2011, p. 1). Researchers (Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 2002) emphasize a great diffi  culty in measuring the degree of decentral-
ization based on the example of only one indicator of fi scal decentralization.  e idea 
to measure the degree of decentralization has been largely inconclusive mainly due 
to no consensus among scholars on its precise defi nition (Sharma, 2006). Many pa-
pers address this issue in economics, but no a empts have been made to measure the 
degree of cultural decentralization. A number of studies have developed qualitative 
research aiming at assessing the quality and the way decentralization in the cultural 
sector functions.  us, the aim of this paper is not to rigorously measure the degree 
of advancement of decentralization/recentralization, but to verify that cultural policy 
has been recentralized since 2015.  erefore, it contributes to the debate largely by 
providing knowledge on the complex process of decentralization in the cultural policy 
in Poland and its present condition. Below the analysis mostly relies on qualitative 
study and to some extent on quantitative evidence to look more precisely at some 
tendencies. 
Two periods will be analyzed, taking into account three indicators: political, fi scal 
and administrative decentralization.  e fi rst period covers the years 2007-2015 – the 
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period of the coalition of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL). 
 e fi rst coalition government was formed a er the parliamentary elections of Octo-
ber 21, 2007.  e second PO-PSL coalition government was formulated a er the sub-
sequent elections in 2011 and lasted until September 2014.  e PO-PSL governments 
were a continuation of the transformations initiated in 1989 and fi  ed into the politi-
cal model called the  ird Republic of Poland.
 e second period covers the years 2015-2017. It began when the Law and Justice 
Party (PiS) came to power and formed a one-party government (it has been function-
ing until now – as of the end of 2019) – however, only the initial period was taken into 
account due to the availability of statistical data).  e comparability of the analysis 
of these two periods – the PO-PSL coalition government and the PiS government – is 
hindered by disproportionate time frames of these two periods, and the diffi  culty in 
interpreting trends from 2015, which was a transitional period (the PiS government 
came to power on November 16, 2015). However, it was recognized that even such a 
short period (the data concerning the PiS government cover only two full years – 2016 
and 2017) may reveal interesting trends.  e obvious premise that the PiS government 
may constitute an interesting point of reference, or even a counterpoint to the gov-
ernments of the PO-PSL coalition, is the fact that the continuity of the political system 
was to some extent broken with the negative evaluation of the entire legacy of 1989 
by PiS politicians.
4.  e decentralization of cultural policy in Poland. Findings
4.1. Political (system) decentralization 
 e Civic Platform’s programs from 2007 and 2011 both call for deetatization and 
strengthening the autonomy of self-governments. From the political point of view the 
Civic Platform’s programs show the decentralization of cultural policy. In both pro-
grams culture was perceived as a carrier of pluralism, individuality and dialogue, but 
also as an element of economic development.  is made a clear link between trends 
in European cultural policies (Bieczyk-Missala, 2016), and the call to create favorable 
conditions for the development of the culture industry and strengthening civil society. 
According to the programs’ vision, the responsibility for decentralized cultural sector 
was spread among the state, local governments and non-governmental organizations. 
 is kind of horizontal cooperation was visible in extensive grant programs designed 
to support diverse cultural NGOs. Partially adapted Anglo-Saxon solutions (e.g. arm’s 
length principle, state lo eries) were highly a ractive for the Polish model, which was 
to be a step to strengthen the autonomy of the entities engaged in cultural activities 
and diminish the infl uence of the state on cultural institutions (a step towards the 
decentralization of the sector).  e call for diversifi cation of funding sources showed 
again the Anglo-Saxon way of thinking (e.g. the call for sponsorship) to be imple-
mented in a country where philanthropy just started to revive a er a long break. 
 e Law and Justice election program displays the characteristics of recentraliza-
tion trends in this area. Its current implications are visible on various levels, and from 
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the point of view of cultural policy they negatively aff ect the Polish cultural system 
(Kubecka, 2015).  e Law and Justice cultural policy is ideologically marked and real-
izes the vision of culture subordinated to the state.  ere is a very strong accent put 
on the role of the state in the sphere of culture (the state as a caretaker and guardian 
of culture). It clearly focuses on several areas: history and identity policy, supporting 
Polish heritage and traditions, participation of broad social groups in culture (Kubec-
ka, 2015), promoting Christian and patriotic values.  is stays in contrast with the 
Civic Platform’s vision that understood culture as a laboratory of the future, change-
ability, and pluralism. 
 e Law and Justice party shows its clear preference to directly manage cultural 
sphere to instrumentally reach its centralist goals. Its cultural policy forces the im-
plementation of centralized mechanisms giving the authorities the mandate to have 
a hold over nearly all the cultural sector by means of diverse instruments (including 
fi nancial or personal) to make the message consistent with the values articulated by 
the central authority. Again, as a result, there are ineff ective organizational structures 
and fi nancing based mainly on public subsidies to those organizations that implement 
the ideological vision of the Law and Justice party.  us, cultural institutions might 
be treated instrumentally, losing their autonomy in the fi eld of running cultural pro-
grams.  is recentralization trend is visible also in the excessive concentration of the 
public sector on the protection of cultural heritage instead of promoting new cultural 
values, while initiatives promoting other, liberal values are not supported. 
4.2. Fiscal decentralization (public fi nance) decentralization 
Public funding is one of the main sources of fi nancing culture in Poland, both for 
public and non-governmental organizations, where public subsidies compose 55% of 
their income (Adamiak et al., 2016). Cultural institutions organized by local govern-
ments constitute the dominant group in the landscape of cultural institutions in Po-
land, which also explains the prevalence of local government expenditure on culture 
in total amounts spent on culture.
In the years 2007-2014, expenditure in the state budget chapter 921 ‘Culture and 
protection of national heritage’ was small in relation to expenditure in other chapters, 
and constituted on average 0.5% of the state budget expenditure. In 2015, there was 
a clear increase in the expenditure on culture in the total state expenditure to 0.62%, 
and it reached 0.89% in 2017. Cumulatively from 2007 to 2017, a total of PLN 20,288 
million was spent on culture from the state budget (an average of PLN 1,844.4 million 
a year). Culture expenditure grew from PLN 1,313.7 million in 2007, 1,964.8 million in 
2015 to PLN 2,586.7 million in 2016 and 3,331.9 in 2017 – in 2016 when the Law and 
Justice party was in power, a signifi cant increase in expenditure from the state budget 
on culture was recorded by 31% in relation to the previous year (see Figure 1). 
 e share of expenditure in particular budget chapters changed during the an-
alyzed period, however, some general trends are visible. Expenditure in the budget 
chapter Museums increased (from 23.9% in 2007 to 28.8% in 2015). In 2016 expenditure 
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on museums increased signifi cantly to 45.1% (the largest share of the state budget for 
culture), what nominally was the amount of 1,132,984 thousand PLN.  ese statistics 
clearly indicate that museums are the priority in fi nancing culture in Poland. For ex-
ample, the funds were used to purchase a unique Czartoryski Family Art Collection 
(476.614,8 thousand PLN) (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 2018, p. 14), and to fi nance at least 
several multiannual initiatives in line with history policy pursued by the Law and 
Justice government at the end of 2015 and in 2016. 
A particular a ention must be given to the fi gures in 2017. In 2017, museums were 
still an important chapter covered by the state budget, however, at that time it was 
the second largest expenditure (reduced level of fi nancing to 19.1% of the state expen-
diture on culture from the chapter 921, that is, in 2017 museums received subsidies in 
the amount of 559.346 thousand PLN whereas in 2016 it was 1.132.984 thousand PLN) 
(Report on the National Public Budget Execution). 
 e largest expenditure in 2017 was exceptionally planned in the budget chapter 
TV and radio broadcasting – 980,000 thousand PLN (that is, 30.1% of the state expen-
diture in the state budget chapter 921).  is resulted from the change of the Budget 
Act.  e argument for such a signifi cant expenditure was to recompensate public TV 
and radio the decrease in income from the broadcast receiving license in Poland in 
the period 2010-2017 (Report on the National Public Budget Execution). In the Polish 
reality it is a signal of political signifi cance to support a state-fi nanced media that are 
seen as a government propaganda tool (Klepka, 2017). 
 e participation of the local and regional governments in fi nancing culture oscil-
lated around 80% between 2007 and 2010, with a slight upward trend (although it was 
Figure 1: State budget expenditure on culture and protection of national heritage 2007-2017 (Mln PLN)
Source: Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Statistics Poland), Culture in 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
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not a permanent trend). It was a sign of a gradual – though evolutionary – moving 
the accent in funding culture on the level of self-governments (see Figure 2). In 2014, 
the last full year of Civic Platform government, it was 81.4%.  is trend was rapidly 
reversed at the time the Law and Justice party came into power. 
During the next years, and especially in 2017, there was a sharp decline in the 
share of local governments in fi nancing culture, to 69.4%. Simultaneously, there was 
a signifi cant increase in the share of central budget expenditure. In the area of fi nanc-
ing, the centralization trend is clearly visible (see Figure 3).
 e implications of the tendency for growing expenditure on culture from the state 
budget include e.g. acquisition and creation of new cultural state institution of ideo-
logical profi le in 2015-2016, and a huge subsidy in the budget chapter TV and radio 
broadcasting in 2017.  is results from a political decision to establish and fi nance 
new national institutions which are subordinated to the center, also ideologically. In 
consequence, there is an apparent shi  towards more extensive central funding of 
culture with an accent put on those initiatives which promote values important for 
the state. 
 e belief of Law and Justice cultural statements is that it is required for state 
funded culture to meet standards set up by the government.  e eff ect is to limit 
the autonomy of the cultural sector. Decentralization might be seen as undesirable 
since it reduces the control power of the central government over the public cultural 
sphere.  is situation is assessed negatively (Musiałek et al., 2019), and its selected 
features remind of previous communistic autocratic system (lesser transparency of 
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public funds spending, excessive dependence of cultural entities on public fi nancing, 
fi nancial subsidies given by public governance levels to public cultural institutions or 
NGOs following an ideological path of the Law and Justice, strengthening the con-
trolling power of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage). 
4.3. Administrative decentralization
 e Ministry of Culture and National Heritage fi nances or co-fi nances the activ-
ities of many organizational units subordinated to and supervised by the ministry, 
including approx. 300 budgetary units – holders of state budget funds, and about 100 
organizational units subordinated to and supervised by the minister. 
 e Civil Platform – Polish People Party coalition brought minor changes to the 
number of state cultural institutions. Very few new institutions were established at 
the time. Overall, 41 state institutions were run in 2007, while this number increased 
to 48 in 2014 (Report on the National Public Budget Execution, 2007, 2014, 2015, 2016). 
 is period was of evolutionary type in terms of establishing new state cultural insti-
tutions – changes in this area were small.  ere is some regularity in spatial distribu-
tion – some regions have invariably the highest number of cultural entities or they 
have certain types of cultural entities. Some entities, due to the nature of their activi-
ties, usually operate in certain areas – theatres, music institutions (e.g. philharmonic 
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orchestras), and multiplex cinemas are most o en located in large cities, while in 
small towns and villages there are cultural or community centers.  e very important 
benefi t of decentralization, that is, territorial diff usion of cultural establishments and 
broad access of citizens to cultural facilities has been unchanged despite recentraliza-
tion trends. 
However, the short period under the Law and Justice government shows interest-
ing recentralistic trends in running cultural policy. In 2016, there was an increase in 
the number of state cultural institutions (6 institutions were established) and in the 
number of cultural institutions run together with local governments (3 institutions 
more).  is trend continues a er 2016, with a further growth of the state entities. In 
2017, 9 state cultural institutions were established out of them 5 were new institutions 
and 4 were established as result of the merge of cultural institutions whose programs 
profi les were comparable. Also, in 2017 8 cultural institutions started to be run togeth-
er with local governments, while in 2018 2 new institutions were established (Regis-
ters of cultural foundations and institutions). 
 e government of the Law and Justice revealed the trend to establish new cultural 
institutions that are managed centrally and which are clearly aimed to promote values 
preferred by the party. It shows the inclination towards selective and centralized cul-
tural policy. Among newly established state institutions or institutions transformed 
recently into state institutions are: Museum of Polish History in Warszawa, Józef
Piłsudski Museum in Sulejówek, National Institute of Polish Cultural Heritage Abroad, 
National Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning, and Polish Royal Opera. Ad-
ministrative recentralization is employed here as an instrument to formulate clear, 
symbolic message approved from the top that concentrates on history and identity 
policy, and promotes Polish heritage and tradition. 
Subordination plays here the crucial role. Since the Law and Justice government, 
the center increasingly has participated in the cultural administration playing the role 
of the sole decisive body in the cultural policy. Its direct implication is that the center 
takes decisions that the periphery simply executes; it is clearly seen in the profi le of 
all cultural institutions established by the Law and Justice Party, promoting history 
policy, patriotism and Christian values, and omi ing references to European condi-
tions and experiences; an example is the controversy related to administration of the 
Museum of the Second World War (Paszulka, 2019).  is profi le explains the nature of 
expenditure (a clear increase in state budget expenditure on museums, i.e. institutions 
implementing the above-mentioned postulates of the ruling party). 
 e next important implication of administrative recentralization is the pressure 
to politically appoint or replace previous directors of cultural institutions (e.g. in May 
2019 Dariusz Stola won the competition for director of POLIN Museum of the History 
of Polish Jews, but the Minister of Culture politically has not accepted the selected 
candidate and has not appointed him to the post) (Dariusz Stola’s Statement). Also, 
there are a lot of examples of replacing directors of cultural institutions with man-
agers agreeing with the Law and Justice’s vision of cultural policy (Chaciński, 2019). 
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Again, from the point of view of cultural policy, those examples negatively aff ect the 
performance of cultural organizations that should meet diverse expectations of citi-
zens and other stakeholders of cultural policy (Chaciński, 2019). At this recentraliza-
tion trend, administrative power allows to diff use political and administrative power 
to implement cultural policy by diff erent decision-makers, as long as diff erent stake-
holders pursue the ideological profi le of the cultural policy set by Law and Justice.
5. Conclusions
Not much research on recentralization trends in cultural policy of CEE countries 
has been conducted.  is study contributes to recent academic debates, reinforcing 
the view that decentralization of cultural sector in CEE countries was only partly 
successful, and brought a wave towards recentralization. Cultural policy analysts can 
be informed through this study about the conditions of running cultural policy in Po-
land.  is might enhance understanding of practical ma ers as far as cultural policy 
is concerned. 
 is research allows to point at re-centralization wave in Poland since the Law and 
Justice Party came into power (2015). Poland is not the only country incorporating 
this tendency. In Hungary, Fidesz, a national-conservative and right-wing populist 
political party brought about fundamental changes also in cultural policies, that is, 
decision-making by high level functionaries (Inkei, 2016) and the discourse of patrio-
tism-nationalism (Kristóf, 2017, p. 19). 
In the Polish cultural policy, the trend toward decentralization in the 1990s (but 
it was the so called centralized decentralization) and presently towards recentraliza-
tion has blurred the clear distinction between the responsibilities of diff erent actors 
and their functions (profi ling cultural service provision, its fi nancing, and supervis-
ing). It might result from le over elements of the previous system, which negatively 
aff ect horizontal and vertical coherence of the government actions and intersectoral 
cooperation.
 e possible implications of current recentralization trend might be seen as ‘instru-
mental cultural policy’ (Gray, 2007) that refers not to use cultural resources to imple-
ment purely cultural or artistic objectives but to an emphasis on secondary purposes 
such as developing right-wing narratives about the Polish identity and national pride 
or support other political purposes by means of various instruments. Current recen-
tralization wave unveils not only increasing participation of the center in fi nancing 
culture (fi scal factor), but also retaining the central power to appoint representatives 
of regional authorities and infl uencing the decisions of regional bodies (administrative 
factor), as well as insisting on supporting a selected range of cultural projects to be 
implemented – the party opposes public funding of culture that is not perceived as 
part of the national (political factor). Recentralization contributes to the consolidation 
of the central government’s control power over the public cultural sphere.
 is conclusion emphasizes the need to explore the capacity, implementation and 
policy constraints of this process. What is the quality of cultural services provided 
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in the centralized and decentralized system? Do central government and also local 
governments have a long-term concept of what organization is going to provide, 
what kind of cultural services and to what extent? If a stronger role of the center has 
emerged in the consequence of recentralization, what role will non-governmental or-
ganizations and private sector organizations play in cultural policy? What are possible 
joint elements of recentralization process in CEE countries? 
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